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Abstract
This article presents iALC, an intuitionistic version of the classical
description logic ALC, based on the framework for constructive modal
logics presented by Simpson [14] and related to description languages, via
hybrid logics, by dePaiva [3]. This article corrects and extends the pre-
sentation of iALC appearing in [4]. It points out the difference between
iALC and the intuitionistic hybrid logic presented in [3]. Completeness
and soundness proofs are provided. A brief discussion on the computa-
tional complexity of iALC provability is taken. It is worth mentioning
that iALC is used to formalize legal knowledge [10, 9, 8, 7], and in fact,
was specifically designed to this goal.
1 Intuitionistic ALC
The iALC logic is based on the framework for intuitionistic modal logic IK
proposed in [14, 5, 13]. These modal logics arise from interpreting the usual
possible worlds definitions in an intuitionistic meta-theory. As we will see in the
following paragraphs, ideas from [1] were also used, where the framework IHL,
for intuitionistic hybrid logics, is introduced. iALC concepts are described as:
C,D ::= A | ⊥ | ⊤ | ¬C | C ⊓D | C ⊔D | C ⊑ D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
where C,D stands for concepts, A for an atomic concept, R for an atomic role.
We could have used distinct symbols for subsumption of concepts and the sub-
sumption concept constructor but this would blow-up the calculus presentation.
This syntax is more general than standard ALC since it includes subsumption
⊑ as a concept-forming operator. We have no use for nested subsumptions, but
they do make the system easier to define, so we keep the general rules. Nega-
tion could be defined via subsumption, that is, ¬C = C ⊑ ⊥, but we find it
convenient to keep it in the language. The constant ⊤ could also be omitted
since it can be represented as ¬⊥.
A constructive interpretation of iALC is a structure I consisting of a non-
empty set ∆I of entities in which each entity represents a partially defined
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individual; a refinement pre-ordering I on ∆I , i.e., a reflexive and transitive
relation; and an interpretation function ·I mapping each role name R to a binary
relation RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I and atomic concept A to a set AI ⊆ ∆I which is closed
under refinement, i.e., x ∈ AI and x I y implies y ∈ AI . The interpretation
I is lifted from atomic concepts to arbitrary concepts via:
⊤I =df ∆I
⊥I =df ∅
(¬C)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .x  y ⇒ y 6∈ CI}
(C ⊓D)I =df CI ∩DI
(C ⊔D)I =df C
I ∪DI
(C ⊑ D)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .(x  y and y ∈ CI)⇒ y ∈ DI}
(∃R.C)I =df {x | ∃y ∈ ∆I .(x, y) ∈ RI and y ∈ CI}
(∀R.C)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .x  y ⇒ ∀z ∈ ∆I .(y, z) ∈ RI ⇒ z ∈ CI}
Following the semantics of IK, the structures I are models for iALC if they
satisfy two frame conditions:
F1 if w ≤ w′ and wRv then ∃v′.w′Rv′ and v ≤ v′
F2 if v ≤ v′ and wRv then ∃w′.w′Rv′ and w ≤ w′
The above conditions are diagrammatically expressed as:
w′
R //
(F1)
v′
w
R //
≤
OO
v
≤
OO and w
′ R //
(F2)
v′
w
R //
≤
OO
v
≤
OO
Our setting simplifies [11], since iALC satisfies (like classicalALC) ∃R.⊥ = ⊥
and ∃R.(C ⊔D) = ∃R.C ⊔ ∃R.D.
Building up from the Simpson’s constructive modal logics (called here IML),
in [1], it is introduced intuitionistic hybrid logics, denoted by IHL. Hybrid logics
add to usual modal logics a new kind of propositional symbols, the nominals,
and also the so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal is assumed to be true
at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. If x
is a nominal and X is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula x :X called a
satisfaction statement can be formed. The satisfaction statement x :X expresses
that the formula X is true at one particular world, namely the world denoted by
x. In hindsight one can see that IML shares with hybrid formalisms the idea of
making the possible-world semantics part of the deductive system. While IML
makes the relationship between worlds (e.g., xRy) part of the deductive system,
IHL goes one step further and sees the worlds themselves x, y as part of the
deductive system, (as they are now nominals) and the satisfaction relation itself
as part of the deductive system, as it is now a syntactic operator, with modality-
like properties. In contrast with the above mentioned approaches, ours assign
a truth values to some formulas, also called assertions, they are not concepts
as in [1], for example. Below we define the syntax of general assertions (A)
2 2013
1 INTUITIONISTIC ALC
and nominal assertions (N) for ABOX reasoning in iALC. Formulas (F ) also
includes subsumption of concepts interpreted as propositional statements.
N ::= x : C | x : N A ::= N | xRy F ::= A | C ⊑ C
where x and y are nominals, R is a role symbol and C is a concept. In particular,
this allows x : (y : C), which is a perfectly valid nominal assertion.
Definition 1 (outer nominal) In a nominal assertion x : γ, x is said to be the
outer nominal of this assertion. That is, in an assertion of the form x : (y : γ),
x is the outer nominal.
We write I, w |= C to abbreviate w ∈ CI which means that entity w satisfies
concept C in the interpretation I1. Further, I is a model of C, written I |= C
iff ∀w ∈ I.I, w |= C. Finally, |= C means ∀I.I |= C. All previous notions are
extended to sets Φ of concepts in the usual universal fashion. Given the hybrid
satisfaction statements, the interpretation and semantic satisfaction relation are
extended in the expected way. The statement I, w |= x : C holds, if and only
if, ∀zx I x . I, zx |= C. In a similar fashion, I, w |= xRy holds ,if and only if,
∀zx  x.∀zy  y.(xIx , z
I
y ) ∈ R
I . That is, the evaluation of the hybrid formulas
does not take into account only the world w, but it has to be monotonically
preserved. It can be observed that for every w′, if xI  w′ and I, x′ |= α, then
I, w′ |= α is a property holding on this satisfaction relation.
In common reasoning tasks the interpretation I and the entity w in a verifica-
tion goal such as I, w |= δ are not given directly but are themselves axiomatized
by sets of concepts and formulas. Usually we have a set Θ 2 of formulas and
the set Γ of concepts. Accordingly:
Definition 2 We write Θ,Γ |= δ if it is the case that:
∀I.((∀x ∈ ∆I .(I, x |= Θ))
⇒ ∀(Nom(Γ, δ)).∀~z  Nom(Γ, δ).(I, ~z |= Γ⇒ I, ~z |= δ) (1)
where ~z denotes a vector of variables z1, . . . , zk and Nom(Γ, δ) is the vector of
all outer nominals occurring in each nominal assertion of Γ∪{δ}. x is the only
outer nominal of a nominal assertion {x : γ}, while a (pure) concept γ has no
outer nominal.
A Hilbert calculus for iALC is provided following [13, 14, 5]. It consists of all
axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic plus the axioms and rules displayed in
Figure 1. The Hilbert calculus implements TBox-reasoning. That is, it decides
the semantical relationship Θ, ∅ |= C. Θ has only formulas as members.
A Sequent Calculus for iALC is also provided. The logical rules of the Se-
quent Calculus for iALC are presented in Figure 2. 3 The structural rules and
1In IHL, this w is a world and this satisfaction relation is possible world semantics
2Here we consider only acycled TBox with ⊑ and ≡.
3The reader may want to read Proof Theory books, for example, [15, 2, 12, 6].
3 2013
1 INTUITIONISTIC ALC
0. all substitution instances of theorems of IPL
1. ∀R.(C ⊑ D) ⊑ (∀R.C ⊑ ∀R.D)
2. ∃R.(C ⊑ D) ⊑ (∃R.C ⊑ ∃R.D)
3. ∃R.(C ⊔D) ⊑ (∃R.C ⊔ ∃R.D)
4. ∃R.⊥ ⊑ ⊥
5. (∃R.C ⊑ ∀R.C) ⊑ ∀R.(C ⊑ D)
MP If C and C ⊑ D are theorems, D is a theorem too.
Nec If C is a theorem then ∀R.C is a theorem too.
Figure 1: The iALC axiomatization
the cut rule are omitted but they are as usual. The δ stands for concepts or
assertions (x : C or xRy), α and β for concept and R for role. ∆ is a set of for-
mulas. In rules p-∃ and p-∀, the syntax ∀R.∆ means {∀R.α | α ∈ concepts(∆)},
that is, all concepts in ∆ are universal quantified with the same role. The as-
sertions in ∆ are kept unmodified. In the same way, in rule p-N the addition
of the nominal is made only in the concepts of ∆ (and in δ if that is a concept)
keeping the assertions unmodified.
The propositional connectives (⊓,⊔,⊑) rules are as usual, the rule ⊔2-r is
omitted. The rules are presented without nominals but for each of these rules
there is a counterpart with nominals. For example, the rule ⊑-r has one similar:
∆, x : α⇒ x : β
n-⊑-r
∆⇒ x : (α ⊑ β)
The main modification comes for the modal rules, which are now role quan-
tification rules. We must keep the intuitionistic constraints for modal operators.
Rule ∃-l has the usual condition that y is not in the conclusion. Concerning the
usual condition on the ∀-r rule, it is not the case in this system, for the inter-
pretation of the a nominal assertion in a sequent is already implicitly universal
(Definition 2).
Theorem 1 The sequent calculus described in Fig. 2 is sound and complete for
TBox reasoning, that is Θ, ∅ |= C if and only if Θ ⇒ C is derivable with the
rules of Figure 2.
The completeness of our system is proved relative to the axiomatization of
iALC, shown in Figure 1. The proof is presented in Section 2.
The soundness of the system is proved directly from the semantics of iALC
including the ABOX, that is, including nominals. The semantics of a sequent
is defined by the satisfaction relation, as shown in Definition 2. The sequent
Θ,Γ ⇒ δ is valid if and only if Θ,Γ |= γ. Soundness is proved by showing
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∆, δ ⇒ δ ∆, x : ⊥ ⇒ δ
∆, xRy ⇒ y : α
∀-r
∆⇒ x : ∀R.α
∆, x : ∀R.α, y : α, xRy ⇒ δ
∀-l
∆, x : ∀R.α, xRy ⇒ δ
∆⇒ xRy ∆⇒ y : α
∃-r
∆⇒ x : ∃R.α
∆, xRy, y : α⇒ δ
∃-l
∆, x : ∃R.α⇒ δ
∆, α⇒ β
⊑-r
∆⇒ α ⊑ β
∆1 ⇒ α ∆2, β ⇒ δ
⊑-l
∆1,∆2, α ⊑ β ⇒ δ
∆⇒ α ∆⇒ β
⊓-r
∆⇒ α ⊓ β
∆, α, β ⇒ δ
⊓-l
∆, α ⊓ β ⇒ δ
∆⇒ α ⊔1-r
∆⇒ α ⊔ β
∆, α⇒ δ ∆, β ⇒ δ
⊔-l
∆, α ⊔ β ⇒ δ
∆, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.∆, ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
∆⇒ α p-∀
∀R.∆⇒ ∀R.α
∆⇒ δ p-N
x : ∆⇒ x : δ
Figure 2: The System SCiALC : logical rules
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that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent and that the initial
sequent is valid. This proof is presented in Section 3.
We note that although we have here fixed some inaccuracies in the presen-
tation of the iALC semantics in [4], the system presented here is basically the
same, excepted that here the propositional rules are presented without nominals.
Given that, the soundness of the system proved in [4] can be still considered
valid without further problems. Note also that the proof of soundness provides
in Section 3 is regarded the full language of iALC. It considers nominals and
assertion on nominals relationship, that is it concerns ABOX and TBOX. The
proof of completeness is for the TBOX only. A proof of completeness for ABOX
can be done by the method of canonical models. For the purposes of this article,
we choose to show the relative completeness proof with the sake of showing a
simpler proof concerning TBOX.
2 The completeness of SCiALC system
We show the relative completeness of SCiALC regarding the axiomatic presen-
tation of iALC presented in Figure 1. To prove the completeness of SCiALC it
is sufficient to derive in SCiALC the axioms 1–5 of iALC. It is clear that all
substitution instances of IPL theorems can also be proved in SCiALC using only
propositional rules. The MP rule is a derived rule from the SCiALC using the
cut rule. The Nec rule is the p-∀ rule in the system with ∆ empty. In the first
two proofs below do not use nominals for given better intuition of the reader
about the use of rules with and without nominals.
Axiom 1:
α⇒ α β ⇒ β
⊑-l
α ⊑ β, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.(α ⊑ β), ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
⊑-r
∀R.(α ⊑ β)⇒ ∃R.α ⊑ ∃R.β
Axiom 2:
α⇒ α β ⇒ β
⊑-l
α ⊑ β, α⇒ β
p-∀
∀R.(α ⊑ β), ∀R.α⇒ ∀R.β
⊑-r
∀R.(α ⊑ β)⇒ ∀R.α ⊑ ∀R.β
Axiom 3:
xRy, y : ⊥ ⇒ x : ⊥
∃-l
x : ∃R.⊥ ⇒ x : ⊥ ⊑-r
⇒ x : (∃R.⊥ ⊑ ⊥)
Axiom 4:
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x : ∃R.α⇒ x : ∃R.α
⊔1-r
x : ∃R.α⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
x : ∃R.β ⇒ x : ∃R.β
⊔2-r
x : ∃R.β ⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
⊔-l
x : ∃R.(α ⊔ β)⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
Axiom 5:
xRy, y : α⇒ y : α xRy, y : α⇒ xRy
∃-r
xRy, y : α⇒ x :∃R.α
xRy, y : α, y : β,∀R.β ⇒ y : β
∀-l
xRy, y : α, x :∀R.β ⇒ y : β
⊑-l
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β), xRy, y : α⇒ y : β
∀-r
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β), xRy ⇒ y : (α ⊑ β)
∀-r
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β)⇒ x : ∀R.(α ⊑ β)
⊑-r
⇒ x : [(∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β) ⊑ ∀R.(α ⊑ β)]
3 Soundness of SCiALC system
In this section we prove that.
Proposition 1 If Θ,Γ⇒ δ is provable in SCiALC then Θ,Γ |= γ.
Proof: We prove that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent
and that the initial sequents are valid. The definition of a valid sequent (Θ,Γ |=
γ) is presented in Definition 2.
The validity of the axioms is trivial. We first observe that any application
of the rules ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔1-r,⊔2-r, ⊔-l of SCiALC where the sequents do not
have any nominal, neither in Θ nor in Γ, is sound regarded intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic kripke semantics, to which the validity definition above collapses
whenever there is no nominal in the sequents. Thus, in this proof we concen-
trate in the case where there are nominals. We first observe that the nominal
version of ⊑-r, the validity of the premises includes
∀(Nom(Γ, δ)).∀~z  Nom(Γ, δ).(I, ~z |= Γ⇒ I, ~z |= δ)
This means that Γ holds in any worlds ~z  ~x for the vector ~x of nominals
occurring in Γ. This includes the outer nominal xi in δ (if any). In this case the
semantics of ⊑ is preserved, since ~z includes zi  xi. With the sake of a more
detailed analysis, we consider the following instance:
x : α1, y : α2 ⇒ x : β
⊑-r
α1 ⇒ x : α2 ⊑ β
Consider an iALC structure I = 〈U ,, RI . . . , CI〉 In this case, for any I
and any z1, z2 ∈ UI if z1  xI , z1  yI , such that, I, zi |= α1 and I, zi |= α2,
we have that I, zi |= x : β, since the premise is valid, by hypothesis. In this
case, by the semantics of ⊑ we have I, zi |= x : α1 ⊑ β. The conclusion of the
rule is valid too.
The argument shown above for the ⊑-r rule is analogous for the nominal
versions of ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔1-r,⊔2-r, ⊔-l. Consider the rule ∀-r.
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∆, xRy ⇒ y : α
∀-r
∆⇒ x : ∀R.α
Since the premise is valid we have that if ∀zx  xI , ∀zy  yI , (zx, zy) ∈ RI
then ∀zy  yI .I, zy |= γ. This entails that xI ∈ (∀R.γ)I , for xI  xI . We
observe that by the restriction on the rule application, y does not occur in ∆,
it only occurs in xRy and y : α. The truth of these formulas are subsumed by
∀R.γ. The conclusion does not need to consider them any more. The conclusion
is valid too. Another way to see its soundness is to prove that if xRy ⇒ y : α
is valid, then so is ⇒ x : ∀R.α. This can be show by the following reasoning:
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, zy |= y : α)))
that is the same as:
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, yI |= α)))
Using the fact that ∀yI(yI  yI), we obtain:
∀xI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀yI((zx, y
I) ∈ RI → I, yI |= α))
The above condition states that ⇒ x : ∀R.α is valid.
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, zy |= y : α)))
Consider the rule ∀-l:
∆, x : ∀R.α, y : α, xRy ⇒ δ
∀-l
∆, x : ∀R.α, xRy ⇒ δ
As in the ∀-r case, we analyze the simplest validity preservation: if x :
∀R.α ∧ xRy is valid, then so is x : ∀R.α ∧ y : α ∧ xRy. The first condition is:
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I →
((I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ (I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)→
(I, zy |= y : α) ∧ (I, zx |= y : α)))) (2)
Using zy = y
I , eliminating zx from the term, and, using the fact that I, zy |=
y : α is valid, iff, I, yI |= α , we obtain
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I →
((I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ (I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)→ (I, y |= α)))) (3)
Consider the semantics of ∃R.α:
(∃R.α)I =df {x | ∃y ∈ U
I .(x, y) ∈ RI and y ∈ αI}
and the following rule:
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∆⇒ xRy ∆⇒ y : α
∃-r
∆⇒ x : ∃R.α
We can see that the premises of the rule entails the conclusion. The premises
correspond to the following conditions:
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)))
and
∀yI∀zy(zy  y
I → ((I, zy |= y : α)))
Instantiating in both conditions zy = y
I and zx = x
I , this yields (xI , yI) ∈ RI ,
such that I, yI |= α, so I, zx |= xI : ∃R.α. Thus, ∃-r is sound. The soundness
of ∃-l is analogous to ∀-l.
Finally, it is worth noting that, for each rule, we can derive the soundness
of its non-nominal version from the proof of soundness of its nominal version.
For instance, the soundness of the nominal version of rule ⊔-l depends on the
diamond conditions F1 and F2. The soundness of its non-nomimal version, is a
consequence of the soundness of the nominal version.
The rules below have their soundness proved as a consequence of the fol-
lowing reasonings in first-order intuitionistic logic that are used for deriving the
semantics of the conclusions from the semantics of the premises:
(p-∃) ∀x(A(x) ∧B(x)→ C(x)) |= ∀xA(x) ∧ ∃xB(x)→ ∃xC(x);
(p-∀) (A(x) |= B(x)) implies ∀y(R(y, x)→ A(x)) |= ∀y(R(y, x)→ B(x));
(p-N) if A |= B then for every Kripke model I and world xI , if I, xI |= A
then I, xI |= B.
∆, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.∆, ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
∆⇒ α p-∀
∀R.∆⇒ ∀R.α
∆⇒ δ p-N
x : ∆⇒ x : δ
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